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Guidelines for the Reform of Immigration
Policy*
BARRY

R.

CHISWICK**

In proposing optimal immigration criteriafor the United
States, the author focuses on the economic consequences of immigration, including the labor-market productivity of immigrants and their impact on the native population. Current immigration policy, according to the author, emphasizes kinship
with a United States citizen or resident alien as the criterion
for rationing immigration visas, largely ignoring the skills or
likely labor-market adjustment of the visa applicant. Moreover, the enforcement of immigration law appears to be minimal and has declined in both real resources and effectiveness in
recent years. The result of limited enforcement and the emphasis on kinship is the arrival of a relatively large proportion of
low-skilled immigrants.
The author proposes a skill-based rationing system for
visas as an alternative to current policy. Under this proposal,
the applicant'slevel of skill would be the primary determinant
in deciding whether to issue a visa. Except for the immediate
relatives of United States citizens, kinship would play a minor
role. This policy, combined with more stringent enforcement of
immigration law, would raise the skill level and favorable economic impact of immigrants. In contrast, the recommendations
of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy
(SCIRP) would favor low-skilled immigrants. Also, the SCIRP
proposals would shift the burden of enforcing immigration law
from the appropriategovernment authoritiesto employers, who
would be forced to screen all workers regarding their immigration status.
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INTRODUCTION

United States immigration policy may have a substantial longterm impact on the economic well-being of the country as a whole,
and on its various demographic groups. It is, however, an issue on
which there is much public confusion, primarily because people approach immigration policy in an emotional rather than a rational
manner.
This article provides a framework for the analysis of immigration policy-the policy of granting permanent resident-alien status.' The framework focuses on both the overall economic impacts
of immigration and the distribution of these impacts. This approach evaluates the economic costs and benefits of alternative immigration policies.
Immigration policy includes the laws and regulations regarding who may enter the United States. It also addresses for what
period of time and for what purposes (i.e., work, study or travel)
people may immigrate. The enforcement of immigration laws and
regulations is equally important. A policy of stringent criteria for
entry combined with lax enforcement is a policy of relatively easy
entry for persons willing to violate the law.
As with most other social regulations, the original intent of
immigration restrictions was to protect the health and safety of the
resident population.' Restrictions created in the nineteenth century were intended to bar criminals, indigents, persons with contagious diseases, and other social misfits. Quantitative restrictions
were then introduced, first against East Asians, and then against
eastern and southern Europeans, partly because of racial and reli1. This article deals with permanent resident aliens or immigrants, and not foreign students, visitors, or temporary workers.
2. For a brief review of the history of United States immigration law and trends, see
Chiswick, Immigrants and Immigration Policy, in CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 285325 (W. Fellner ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Chiswick, Immigration Policy]. The major
legislative development since 1978 is the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat.
102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).

19821

REFORM OF IMMIGRATION POLICY

gious prejudice and xenophobia, and partly to protect the wages of
low-skilled native workers from the competition of unskilled immigrants.3 The 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA)4 eliminated most of the racism and ethnocentrism implicit in U.S. immigration policy. 5 These amendments, and the
1978 amendments pertaining to the Western Hemisphere,' substituted kinship with a U.S. citizen or a resident alien for country of
origin as the primary criterion for obtaining immigration visas.
Immigration policy has widespread economic implications because of its direct and indirect impact on the labor market. The
current kinship-based policy, although superficially appealing on
humanitarian grounds, has generated substantial dissatisfaction.
Adopting this policy in 1965, at a time of seemingly unlimited
prosperity, may have been essential for eliminating the pernicious
quota system based on national origins. But in the current era of
slower increases in productivity, it is even more appropriate to ask
who bears the burden of immigration policy, and whether alternative and equally nonracist policies could have a more favorable
economic impact.
In formulating immigration policy, the effect of immigrants on
the U.S. labor market, and consequently on the income and employment of the native population, is an important consideration.
Because immigrants vary widely in their employment skills, their
impact is not unidimensional. Even if all immigrants shared the
same skills, their impact on the native population would not be
uniform because of the heterogeneity of the native population. Insights into the productivity of immigrants add a new dimension to
the policy debate. They suggest that it is not only the number of
immigrants that is relevant, but also the characteristics of those
immigrants. The characteristics of an annual stream of immigrants
are not exogenous; they largely can be determined by immigration
policy.
Two alternatives to current policy will be discussed in this article. One is a skill-based rationing system in which productivity
characteristics are the primary criteria for rationing visas. The
other is the set of recommendations from the Select Commission
3. Chiswick, Immigration Policy, supra note 2, at 292.
4. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, §§ 8, 24, 79 Stat. 916, 922 (1965) (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. V 1981)).
5. See infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
6. Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907.
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on Immigration and Refugee Policy,' which would increase the role
of kinship in issuing immigration visas and granting amnesty to
illegal aliens. This article concludes that a skill-based rationing
system better satisfies the objectives of promoting economic
growth and reducing the relative size of income transfers in the
economy.
II.

CURRENT IMMIGRATION: POLICY AND

FLOWS

Current immigration law has its basis in the 1965 amendments
to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act.' The 1965 amendments abolished the discredited national-origins quota system instituted in the 1920's, as well as the emphasis on skill or productivity introduced in 1952 for rationing visas." In their place, the
amendments created a "preferences" rationing system that heavily
emphasized kinship with a U.S. citizen or resident alien.10 Skill
7. See infra text accompanying notes 61, 70-88.
S. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, §§ 8, 24, 79 Stat. 916, 922 (1965) (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. V 1981)). The 1952 Act primarily was a recodification of
existing law.
9. See Chiswick, Immigration Policy, supra note 2, at 293-98.
10. The Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203, 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified as
amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. V 1981)), which further amended the Immigration and
Nationality Act, revised the refugee admission procedures. See infra text accompanying
notes 33-37. The current system of the "preferences" rationing system provides,
Allocation of immigrant visas
(a) Categories of preference priorities; per centum limitations; waiting lists
(1) Visas shall be first made available, in a number not to exceed 20 per
centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of this title, to qualified immigrants who are the unmarried sons or daughters of citizens of the United States.
(2) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 26 per
centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of this title, plus any visas not
required for the classes specified in paragraph (1) of this subsection, to qualified
immigrants who are the spouses, unmarried sons or unmarried daughters of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
(3) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 10 per
centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of this title, to qualified immigrants who are members of the professions, or who because of their exceptional
ability in the sciences or the arts will substantially benefit prospectively the national economy, cultural interest, or welfare of the United States, and whose
services in the professions, sciences, or arts are sought by an employer in the
United States.
(4) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 10 per
centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of this title, plus any visas not
required for the classes specified in paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection, to qualified immigrants who are the married sons or the married daughters
of citizens of the United States.
(5) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 24 per
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and refugee status were given relatively minor roles.
The basic features of current immigration law, including the
changes introduced by the Refugee Act of 1980,11 are outlined in
Table 1. The number of immigrants "admitted" to the United
States under various categories is shown for two years in Table 2.12
The worldwide, country, and preference category quotas indicated
in Table 1 refer to ceilings on the number of visas issued per year.
The data on immigration refer to the number of persons entering
the United States with an immigrant visa, or receiving a change in
status to permanent resident alien. Immigrant visas need not be
used in the fiscal year they are issued. Some are never used.
A person may receive immigrant status (permanent resident
alien status) under one of three general categories: (1) as an immediate relative of a U.S. citizen; (2) by other kinship criteria, or (3)
by occupation (skill).' s Also, the Attorney General may grant refucentum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of this title, plus any visas not
required for the classes specified in paragraphs (1) through (4) of this subsection, to qualified immigrants who are the brothers or sisters of citizens of the
United States, provided such citizens are at least twenty-one years of age.
(6) Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 10 per
centum of the number specified in section 1151(a) of this title, to qualified immigrants who are capable of performing specified skilled or unskilled labor, not of a
temporary or seasonal nature, for which a shortage of employable and willing
persons exists in the United States.
(7) Visas authorized in any fiscal year, less those required for issuance to the
classes specified in paragraphs (1) through (6), shall be made available to other
qualified immigrants strictly in the chronological order in which they qualify
(8) A (minor) spouse or child. . . shall, if not otherwise entitled to an immigrant status and the immediate issuance of a visa under paragraphs (1) through
(7) of this subsection, be entitled to the same status . . . if accompanying, or
following to join, his spouse or parent.
8 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. V 1981).
11. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
12. Of the 601,000 immigrants "admitted" in 1978, 230,000 were already in the United
States and received an "adjustment of status." Of these, 122,000 were Cuban and Indochinese refugees (28,000 and 94,000 respectively) whose adjustment of status outside the
numerical limitations was made possible by legislation in 1976 and 1977. Of the 101,000
adjustments made under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the official
status at entry of nearly 60% was "temporary visitors for pleasure." Another 18% were
students. An immigration visa often is easier to obtain from inside the United States than
from outside. U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1978 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 5-6,
10-11 [hereinafter cited as 1978 INS YEARBOOK].
13. "Private bills" are enacted in a small number of cases (138 in the 95th Congress) to
grant immigrant status to individuals who otherwise would not qualify. The Federal Bureau
of Investigation used bogus bribes to congressmen for introducing private immigration bills
in its ABSCAM investigation of congressional corruption.
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gees asylum or parole status.1 ' This enables them to enter and
work in the United States indefinitely, although most eventually
obtain an adjustment of status and become permanent resident
aliens. 15 Obtaining permanent resident alien status is the first step
toward acquiring U.S. citizenship.

14. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (Supp. V 1981).
15. Id. For example, in 1978, 122,000 Cuban and Indochinese refugees became permanent resident aliens outside of the preference and quota system under legislation enacted in
1976 and 1977. 1978 INS YEARBOOK, supra note 12, at 10.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF THE IMMIGRATION PREFERENCE SYSTEM

UNDER THE 1965 AND SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS
TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT

1. Immigrants Not Subject to Numerical Limitation
Spouse and minor children of U.S. citizens and the parents of U.S. citizens over age 21
2. Immigrants Subject to Numerical Limitation in the Preference System
QUOTAS (visas per year)
a

Eastern Hemisphe re a
Western Hemisgh ere
Country ceiling

1965-1978
170,000
120,000
20,000

1981-present

1979-1980

270,000

290,000
20,000

20,000

PREFERENCE SYSTEMc

Maximum proportion
Preference
First
Secondd
Third

Fourth
Fifth

Sixth
Nonpreference

Characteristic
Unmarried adult children
of U.S. citizens
Spouse and unmarried children of
permanent resident aliens
Professionals, and scientists and
artists of exceptional ability
whose services are sought by a
U.S. employer
Married children of U.S. citizens
Siblings of U.S. citizens provided
that such citizens are at least 21
years of age
Workers in occupations for which
labor is scarce in the U.S.
Any applicant not entitled to a
preference
Spouse and minor children of a
preference applicant can be classified with the same preference if a
visa is not otherwise available

of visas
20 percent
26 percent plus any not required
for first preference
10 percent

10 percent plus any not required
for first three preferences
24 percent plus any not required
for first four preferences
10 percent
Amount that is not required for
preference applicants
Charged to appropriate preference

aThe hemisphere quotas were converted to a combined world ceiling of 290,000 visas by the
1978 amendments and reduced to 270,000 visas per year when the Refugee Act of 1980
removed refugees from the preference system.
bCountry ceiling applicable to the Eastern Hemisphere under the 1965 amendments and the
Western Hemisphere since the 1977 amendments.
Cpreference system applicable to the Eastern Hemisphere under the 1965 amendments and
the Western Hemisphere under the 1977 amendments. Prior to 1977, Western Hemisphere
visas issued on a first-come, first-served basis.
dlncreased from 20% with the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980. The six percent previously was allocated to a "refugee preference." This preference was dropped with the passage
of the Refugee Act of 1980, which established a quota of 50,000 visas for refugees outside of
the preference system, and gave the President authority to admit additional refugees. The
Act changed the definition of "refugee" to a person with a well-founded fear of religious,
political, or racial persecution regardless of country of origin, whereas refugee status was
previously applicable only to persons fleeing a communist country or the general area of the
Middle East.
SOURCE: Immigration and Naturalization Service.
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TABLE 2
IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES

FISCAL YEARS 1975

AND

1978

Immigrant Category
Total Immigrants
Immigrants exempt from numerical limitation
Immediate relatives
Immigrants Act of

October 12, 1976, and
October 30, 1977 a
Other
Immigrants subject to limitationb
Eastern Hemisphere
Relative preferences
First preference
Second preference
Fourth preference
Fifth preference
Occupational preferences
Third preference (professionals)
Sixth preference (other workers)
Their spouses and children
Refugees-seventh preference
Nonpreference, private bills,
and others
Western Hemisphere
Relative preferences
First preference
Second preference
Fourth preference
Fifth preference

1975

1978

386,194
104,633
91,504

601,442
260,333
125,819

--

122,441

13,129
160,460
160,460
95,945
871
43,077
3,623
48,374
29,334
8,363
16,724
14,247
9,129
26,052

12,077
165,743
165,743
123,501
1,120
44,116
5,954
72,311
26,295
4,822
17,705
13,768
9,724
6,223

121,101

175,361

--

--

66,796
2,572
33,631
5,450
25,143

---

465
1,183
2,934

----

Occupational preferences
Third preference (professionals)
Sixth preference (other workers)
Their spouses and children

--

Refugees-seventh preference

--

585

Nonpreference, private bills, and others
Natives of Western Hemisphere and Immigrants Act of

--

47,987
55,411

1966 c

121,101

NOTE: Dashes indicate category is not applicable.
aThese acts provide for Cuban and Indochinese refugees adjusting to resident alien status in
the United States.
bExcept for the occupational preferences, spouses and minor children are included in the
totals for the preference category of the immigrants.
cRefers to immigrants who obtained visas prior to the extension of the preference system to
the Western Hemisphere.
SOURCE: U.S. IMMIGRATION

&

NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

1978

STATISTICAL YEARBOOK

1, 6.
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A.

Kinship Criteria

The immediate relatives of United States citizens, i.e., the
spouse, unmarried minor children, and parents of adult citizens,
may enter the United States without numerical limitations.' Although the number of persons entering the United States in this
manner had fluctuated around 100,000 per year since 1965, recently it has increased to about 125,000 per year because of the
increased immigration of spouses and parents of citizens."
Among the visas subject to numerical limitation, at least seventy-four percent (prior to the 1980 Refugee Act) were reserved for
relatives of U.S. citizens and resident aliens.' 8 In 1978, of the
165,743 immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere subject to numerical limitation, seventy-five percent entered under the kinship
.preferences, as reflected in Table 2. Little use was made of the first
preference (unmarried adult children of U.S. citizens and their
children) or the fourth preference (married children of U.S. citizens and their spouses and children). To the extent that these
preferences were undersubscribed, additional persons entered
under the second preference (spouses and unmarried children of
resident aliens and their children) and fifth preference (siblings of
adult U.S. citizens and their spouses and children). During the
1960's and early 1970's, the kinship preferences were not subscribed fully, and "nonpreference" visa applicants were allowed to
immigrate. The rapid increase in the use of the fifth preference,
however, has eliminated this alternative. 9
For the Western Hemisphere, until 1977, visas were issued on
a first-come, first-served basis. As of 1978, new visas were issued
16. The statute provides,
The "immediate relatives" . . . shall mean the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States: Provided,That in the case of parents, such
citizen must be at least twenty-one years of age. The immediate relatives specified in this subsection who are otherwise qualified for admission as immigrants
shall be admitted as such, without regard to the numerical limitations in this
chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1976).
17. 1978 INS YEARBOOK, supra note 12, at 5-6.

18. See Table 1, supra p. 899. The six percent quota for refugees was shifted to the
second preference (a kinship preference) when the Refugee Act of 1980 removed refugees
from the preference system. Refugee Act of 1980 §§ 201, 203, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 1157 (Supp.
V 1981); see infra text accompanying notes 33-37.
19. "Nonpreference" applicants must obtain a labor certificate (demonstrating they
have a "needed" skill and a job waiting for them), invest money in a business in the United
States, or satisfy some other criterion to demonstrate their economic value to the United

States.
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under the preference system. In 1978 more than 55,000 Western
Hemisphere immigrants entered with first-come, first-served visas.
Of the nearly 120,000 immigrants who entered in that year with
preference system visas, fifty-six percent immigrated under the
kinship preferences. Of these, immigration under the first and
fourth preferences was small, in contrast to immigration under the
second and fifth preferences.20
B. Occupational Criteria
The 1965 amendments reserved up to twenty percent of the
visas in the preference system for rationing on the basis of occupation. The third preference provides for the immigration of professionals and persons of exceptional ability in the arts and sciences. 21
The sixth preference provides for the immigration of skilled workers whose services are needed in occupations for which U.S. workers are in short supply.2 2 In either situation, the immigrant and the

U.S. employer are required to complete a cumbersome application
administered by the Department of Labor's Office of Labor Certification.2 8 In general, the employer must demonstrate that appropriate workers are not available in the United States at the prevailing
wage for that job.2
The Office of Labor Certification has predetermined that a
shortage of workers exists for some jobs.25 These jobs, referred to
as Schedule A jobs, include: (1) physicians in a geographic area
that the Department of Health and Human Services has determined to have a shortage of practitioners in the physician's particular specialty; (2) nurses who are already registered in the state of
intended residence or who have passed the examination administered by the Commission on Graduates of Foreign Nursing
Schools; (3) physical therapists qualified to take the state licensing
exam; (4) persons in the sciences and nonperforming arts with exceptional ability, including college teachers; (5) religious practi20. The very large proportion of immigrants in the nonpreference category in 1978 was
a transitional phenomenon; the preference system was introduced too recently for the kinship categories to be filled.
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3) (1976); see supra note 10.
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(6) (1976); see supra note 10.
23. For the current regulations, see Labor Certification Process for Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States, 20 C.F.R. § 656 (1982).
24. Id. §§ 656.20-.32. This requirement is meaningless because for a sufficiently high
wage-a new prevailing wage-fewer workers would be demanded and more workers already
in the United States would be available to the occupation or employer.
25. 20 C.F.R. § 656.10 (1982).
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tioners; and (6) managers in multinational corporations.2"
The Labor Certification Office has "determined" that other
occupations are not to be used as a basis for labor certification,
although labor certifications are given on occasion to applicants in
these occupations." These "Schedule B" occupations include many
that provide employment for immigrants who enter the United
States under other criteria, including personal service attendants,
cleaning staff, kitchen workers,. laborers, nurses' aides, taxicab
drivers, and gardeners.2 8
Although up to twenty percent of the visas subject to the preference system are reserved for occupational preferences, the system's impact on the skill distribution of immigrants is smaller than
might appear. First, the spouse and minor unmarried children of
workers receiving an occupational preference visa generally are
charged to that preference.2 Of the 26,295 persons from the Eastern Hemisphere who entered under an occupational preference in
1978, fifty-two percent were spouses and children, many of whom
subsequently will enter the labor force. 0 Of the 4,582 persons from
the Western Hemisphere, sixty-four percent were spouses and children." Second, when a worker obtains a visa through a labor certification, he is not legally obligated to work for the employer or in
the occupation. The extent of this "leakage" is not known. Third,
there is a tendency for the occupational preferences to be used by
persons who are already in the United States with nonimmigrant
visas, and who are seeking an adjustment of their status. Of the
14,175 occupational-preference visas in 1978, sixty-five percent received an adjustment of status.3 2 That is, foreigners were in the
United States under a student, tourist, or other visa, or were in the
United States illegally, but were able to obtain a labor certification. Finally, the cumbersome certification process, which generally
requires considerable employer cooperation, gives a decided advantage to persons who already are working in the United States.
In spite of these limitations on the size and scope of the num26. Id. Physicians and nurses, who were removed from the Schedule A list in 1976,
rejoined the list in 1980. Dieticians were removed from the list in 1980, apparently because
the national association asserted that there was no shortage. There is apparently no research
basis for the Office of Labor Certification's determinations.
27. 20 C.F.R. §§ 656.11, .23 (1982).
28. Id.
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981); see supra note 10.
30. 1978 INS YEARBOOK, supra note 12, at 18-23.
31. Id. at 15.
32. Id.

904
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ber of immigrants who may enter under the occupational preferences, the preferences are an important source of professional
workers in the immigration stream. Among immigrants in 1978
who reported a profession on their visa application, nearly onefifth of the professionals were beneficiaries of an occupational preference. As shown in Table 3, of the engineers, nurses, physicians,
research workers, scientists, and college and university teachers
who immigrated, more than one-quarter did so under an occupational preference. As would be expected, only a very small proportion of immigrants in other occupations received an occupational
preference, with the notable exception of cooks.
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TABLE 3
BENEFICIARIES OF OCCUPATIONAL PREFERENCES
BY IMMIGRANT STATUS AND OCCUPATION, FIscAL YEAR
THIRD PREFERENCE

1978

SIXTH PREFERENCE

ADMIS-

ADJUSTMENTS OF

ADMIS-

ADJUSTMENTS OF

SIONS

STATUS

SIONS

STATUS

TOTAL

2,091
356
731
146

3,181
454
238
743

2,968
646
479
159

8,976
1,653
1,493
1,071

21

369

8

179

577

43.4

OCCUPATION

PROFESSIONAL,
TECHNICAL, AND
KINDRED
ENGINEERS
NURSES
PHYSICIANS
RESEARCH WORKERS
(NOT SPECIFIED)
SCIENTISTS
(LIFE AND
PHYSICAL)

PERCENTs

AGE

108

237

45

144

534

29.5

TEACHERS
(COLLEGE AND
UNIVERSITY)

47

195

47

180

469

25.3

WRITERS,
ARTISTS, AND
ENTERTAINERS

43

9.4

99

112

211

465

MANAGERS
(EXCEPT FARM)

3

466

1,285

1,764

SALES, CLERICAL, AND
KINDRED

0

145

299

446

CRAFTSMEN AND
KINDRED

0

519

399

918

OPERATIVES
(INCLUDING
TRANSPORT)

0

119

139

258

0.5

LABORERS
(EXCEPT FARM)

0

51

61

112

0.5

0

27

90

117

1.0

1,005
763

4.0
14.3

FARM (LABORERS,
FOREMEN, AND
MANAGERS)
SERVICE (EXCEPT
PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD)
COOKS
PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS

TOTAL

0
0
0
0
2.103

0
3.184

316
6,058

263
2,830

579
14,175

5.5
5.
7b

NOTE: All detailed occupations with 450 or more beneficiaries of an occupational preference
are listed separately.
aPercentage of total number of immigrants reporting that occupation.
bPercentage of immigrants reporting a labor-market occupation. The figure is 2.4% if expressed as a percentage of all immigrants, including housewives, youths, students, the aged,
and others.
SOURCE: U.S. IMMIGRATION

& NATURALIZATION

SERVICE,

1978

STATISTICAL YEARBOOK

18-23.
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In summary, there are many features of the current occupational preferences that substantially reduce the program's ability
to facilitate the immigration of high-productivity workers. But the
preferences are an important source of high-level manpower. That
there are queues for obtaining an occupational-preference visa suggests that even more high-productivity workers would immigrate if
the preference quotas were increased, country ceilings on these categories were removed, and the requirements of both prearranged
employment and the burdensome application procedure were
eased.
C.

Refugees

The 1965 amendments to the INA" and the 1980 Refugee
Act have attempted to regularize the flow of refugees. But events
have shown this to be difficult. The 1965 amendments allocated six
percent of the visas within the preference system to refugees, and
did not change the requirement that a refugee must be fleeing
from either a communist country or the Middle East." The 1980
Refugee Act increased the annual quota of refugees from 17,400 to
50,000 visas.8" The Act defined a refugee as any person with a wellfounded fear of political, religious, ethnic, or racial persecution
(whether from a communist country or otherwise), and who was
37
already in a country of first asylum.
The 1980 Refugee Act was based on the desire to be evenhanded in the treatment of persons fleeing communist and
noncommunist government persecution; it was also based on the
experiences of the Vietnamese boat people. The Act can be criticized for inadequately defining refugee. Moreover, the first asylum
provision penalizes refugees from countries in close proximity to
the United States. For example, Haitians seeking asylum in Florida claimed they were refugees from poverty and, having fled,
could not return without being persecuted by an authoritarian regime. The Cuban boat people-the more than 120,000 persons who
34

33. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 916 (current version codified in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
34. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (current version codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7)(1976) (amended 1980); see supra note 18.
36. Refugee Act of 1980 § 201 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a) (Supp. V 1981)); see supra
note 4. The President may admit additional refugees if the situation requires. 8 U.S.C. §
1157(b) (Supp. V 1981).
37. Refugee Act of 1980 § 201(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (Supp. V 1981)).
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entered the United States in 1980-technically were not eligible
for admission under the Refugee Act because the United States
was the country of first asylum. Although the Cubans were admitted under the Attorney General's ad hoc authority to parole persons into the United States, the status of the Haitians remains
uncertain.
D. Illegal Immigration and Enforcement Resources
The enforcement of immigration law is minimal, in terms of
both the magnitude of the resources and the deterrent effect of the
deployment of these resources. The limited, but not negligible, enforcement of immigration law tends to attract low-skilled illegal
aliens.'
The number of immigration law violations is, of course, unknown."8 The number of illegal immigrants in the United States
has been estimated at between two and twelve million persons, but
a recent view of these estimates by three statisticians at the Bureau of the Census suggests a range of 3.5 million to 6 million persons, of whom about half are Mexican nationals."' Data exist, however, on the number of apprehensions of illegal aliens. Table 4
illustrates that the number of deportable aliens located increased
from 70,000 in 1960 to more than 1,000,000 per year since 1977.0
Of the more than one million deportable aliens located in fiscal
year 1978, nearly 950,000 were Mexican nationals who entered
without inspection, as summarized in Table 5. About 28,000 Mexican nationals entered the United States under other statuses, and
slightly more than 81,000 were persons of other nationalities.
38. A person may become an illegal alien by violating the condition of a legally obtained visa (such as unauthorized employment under a student or visitor visa, or remaining
in the United States beyond the date specified in the visa), entering the United States with
a fraudulent visa, or making a surreptitious entry.

39. See J. Siegel, J. Passel & J. Robinson, Preliminary Review of Existing Studies of
the Number of Illegal Residents in the United States, in SzLECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION &
REFUGEE POLICY, 97TH CONG., 1ST SEss., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST app. e (Comm. Print 1981).

40. The decline in apprehensions in fiscal year 1980, see Table 4, supra p. 908, has been
attributed to the three-month moratorium on interior enforcement, which was intended to
increase compliance with the 1980 Census, and to the diversion of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) resources for the registration of Iranian students and the Cuban boat
people. There are no data on the extent to which the same individual is apprehended more

than once in a year.
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TABLE 4
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE PERSONNEL,
IMMIGRANTS, NONIMMIGRANTS, AND DEPORTABLE ALIENS LOCATED,
FISCAL YEARS

INS Personnel
Average

1960-1980

Total

Workload
Non-

Deportable

immigrants
admitted

aliens
located

Year

Permanent
positions

paid
employmenta

compensable
work yearsa,b

1960
1965
1970
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

6,895
7,043
6,920
8,020
8,832
9,473
10,071
10,997
10,943

6,522
6,747
6,672
7,992
-------

---

265,398
296,697
373,326
386,194
398,615
462,315
601,442
460,348
...

-------

9,227
9,705
9,804
11,655
9,885

-----

Immigrants

1,140,736
2,075,967
4,431,880
7,083,937
7,654,419
8,036,916
9,343,710
-----

70,684
110,371
345,353
766,600
875,915
1,042,215
1,057,977
1,076,418
910,361

NOTE: Since 1977, the fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30; prior to 1977, it was from July 1
to June 30. Dashes under INS Personnel indicate data not included in the source. Dashes under Workload indicate data not available.
aThe data include the full-time equivalent of nonpermanent positions.
blncludes the full-time equivalent of overtime and holiday hours worked. This accounted for the
equivalent of 1,484 compensable work years in 1979 and 1,771 compensable work years in 1980.
SOURCE: U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1978 STATIsTICAL YEARBOOK 62.

TABLE 5
DEPORTABLE ALIENS LOCATED BY STATUS AT ENTRY AND NATIONALITY,
FISCAL YEAR 1978
Nationality

Europe
Asia
North America
Mexico
South America
Africa

Other
Total

EWI

Visitor

295
138
968,219
948,891
2,708
28

5,521
5,008
33,498
21,484
5,557
998

Status at Entry
Student
Crewman

Other

Total

6,317
4,940
828
40
919
507

1,263
1,720
9,234
5,903
962
242

13,981
14,775
1,012,719
976,667
10,801
2,910

585
2,969
944
349
655
1,135

68

1,699

525

281

218

2,791

971,456

52,281

6,813

13,788

13,639

1,057,997

NOTE: EWI = entry without inspection.
SOURCE: U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1978 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 72.

The increase in apprehensions reflects a large increase in illegal immigration, which has been caused by five factors: (1) the end
of the bracero program for temporary farm workers in 1964, (2) the
introduction of numerical limits on Western Hemisphere immigration in 1965, (3) the prospect of amnesty as proposed by the Carter
administration in early 1977, (4) improved transportation and in-

formation networks, and (5) increased competition for jobs among
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low-skilled workers in the major sending countries.
The data on apprehensions reflect, in part, administrative decisions on the allocation of enforcement resources. These decisions,
however, do not necessarily achieve their desired result. For example, although more apprehensions per dollar of enforcement expenditure occur if there is a relative concentration along the Mexican
border, this may not be the maximum deterrent for a given enforcement budget. Apprehensions along the border may have a
minimal deterrent effect if, as many believe, most illegal aliens who
are apprehended and deported while entering without inspection
simply try again a few nights later. Apprehension and deportation
may have a greater long-term deterrent effect if they occur after an
illegal alien has penetrated the border and incurred costs in locating a job and residence. Even though the cost per apprehension
away from the border is higher, it is not necessarily less cost-effective in deterring illegal immigration.' 1 The large and increasing
number of apprehensions along the Mexican border suggests that
the border is porous and that the cost of being apprehended is low
for the illegal alien. If the probability and cost of apprehension
were high, few persons would attempt illegal entry, and the number of apprehensions would be small.
Little is known about the characteristics of illegal aliens.
There are reasons to believe, however, that they are not a random
sample of persons desirous of, but unable to obtain, a legal immigrant visa. Rather, they are disproportionately low-skilled workers.
There is a probability greater than zero that these immigrants will
be apprehended at the border or in the interior. The probability of
detection in the interior is greater for those who come into contact
with the authorities-e.g., the police, an occupational licensing
board, or the personnel department of a government agency or
large firm. Persons with high levels of skill, particularly professionals who require a certification of some sort, are likely to be detected. In addition, the cost of deportation is greater for immigrants with higher levels of skill. If deported, unskilled workers
41. David North estimated that in 1979, border enforcement, interior enforcement, and
antismuggling activities by the border patrol cost $108 per apprehension, while interior en-

forcement by the investigations unit cost $156 per apprehension. The cost per apprehension
for just border-control patrol activities is even less than the cost for over-all border patrol
activities. See D. North, Enforcing the Immigration Law: A Review of the Options 17 (Sept.
1980), reprinted in SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, 97TH CONG., lT
SEss., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST app. E (Comm. Print 1981).
North's study includes several ideas for increasing the efficiency of the enforcement of immigration law at the border and in the interior.
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(and workers with skills that are readily transferable internationally) do not lose the value of their training in the United States.
Country-specific investment in training tends to rise with the skill
level. A deported skilled illegal alien finds that investments in
United States-specific training are not relevant when he returns to
his home country, and that some of the skills specific to the country of origin acquired prior to the illegal migration have subsequently depreciated.
The resources devoted to the enforcement of immigration are
relatively small and have not kept pace with the workload.42 The
number of permanent positions in the Immigration and Naturalization Service increased nearly sixty percent from 1960 to 1979.11
During the same period, the annual number of immigrants more
than doubled, nonimmigrant admission of aliens increased eightfold, and the number of apprehensions of illegal aliens increased
fourteenfold. Not all of the increase in permanent positions reflects
more resources devoted to direct enforcement activities, particularly in recent years. For example, from fiscal year 1977 to 1979 the
INS operating budget increased eleven percent in real dollars, and
the real resources devoted to service to the public, support operations, and program direction increased forty-seven percent during
the same period. In contrast, border enforcement resources increased one percent, detention and deportation resources decreased four percent, and interior enforcement resources decreased
fifteen percent." This reallocation of resources within the Immigration and Naturalization Service away from enforcement activities, particularly interior enforcement, reflected a decision by the
42. In addition to screening persons entering through legal gateways (a function shared
with the Customs Service), and other immigration law enforcement through patrols along
the border and interior enforcement, the 'INS administers exclusion and deportation proceedings. The State Department's Visa Service administers visa applications, and the Labor
Department's Office of Labor Certification issues labor certificates. North estimated that in
fiscal year 1980 there were 11,869 "immigration law enforcement positions." Of these, 8,433
were in the INS (including 2,694 in the border patrol and 1,019 in interior enforcement),
2,287 in the Customs Service, 907 in the State Department, and 242 in the Labor Department's Employment Standards Administration (enforcement of minimum-wage and farmwork regulations). Id. at 13.
43. See Table 4, supra p. 908. The INS publishes detailed tables, including tables that
chart immigrants, nonimmigrants, apprehensions, and naturalizations, in its annual reports
and in its 105-page 1978 Statistical Yearbook. But the annual reports, the 1978 Statistical
Yearbook, and the INS Reporter do not include data on the INS budget, number of personnel, or number of personnel in enforcement units. Apparently, the only published information on these matters is included in the Appendix to the United States Budget.
44. The percentage increase in nominal expenditures was adjusted by the deflator for
federal nondefense purchases of goods and services, which increased 14% during the period.
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Carter administration to grant de facto amnesty for illegal aliens
already living in the United States. Congress showed no interest in
the administration's 1977 legislative proposal for amnesty.4

III.

HETEROGENEITY AMONG IMMIGRANTS

The American public commonly views immigrants either as
unskilled and poorly motivated workers, or as highly successful
and aggressive achievers. These characterizations focus on the extremes. The average immigrant is at neither pole, but is apparently
closer to the latter than the former. More striking is the heterogeneity among immigrants. Immigrants differ almost as much as natives in their earnings, occupational distribution, schooling, and
on-the-job training. They also vary widely in country of origin. Although there is a tendency for most immigrants to be adults in
their twenties at the time they immigrate, this is more the case for
economic migrants than for refugees.
Analytically, the productivity of immigrants is considered
most fruitfully within the context of two models-the transferability of skills and the self-selection of migrants. Immigrants from
English-speaking countries at a similar level of economic development as the United States are more likely to have readily transferable skills than are immigrants from other countries. This implies
that they have higher earnings at arrival, and experience a smaller
rise in earnings with duration of residence. Because of the greater
economic incentive for migration among the most able and ambitious, if other factors are the same, immigrants, particularly economic immigrants, tend to be favorably self-selected for labor market success. Because labor market considerations are less relevant
in the decision to move among refugees and tied movers (those
who move primarily as a consequence of the immigration decision
of a family member) in comparison with economic migrants, the
latter would tend to have more readily transferable skills.
The productivity of immigrants, as measured by their labor
market earnings, varies systematically with several readily measurable variables. 46 For example, earnings are higher for immigrants
45. The Carter administration's proposed 1982 budget included a further decline in real
resources for the INS. "Mr. Crosland [Acting Commissioner] said that the new budget
would maintain the strength of the border patrol, but cut the number of investigators who
look for illegal aliens inside the country and trim the number of inspectors who screen travelers at ports of entry." Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1981, at 4, col. 5.

46. See B.
GRANTS

CHISWICK, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND IMPACT OF IMMI-

(report prepared for the Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Depart-
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with more schooling, whether the schooling was acquired in the
United States or in the country of origin. The effect of schooling
on earnings is greater for immigrants with highly transferable skills
(e.g., economic migrants from English-speaking countries), and is
least for refugees (e.g., Cubans). Earnings also are related positively to the number of years of labor-market experience in the
country of origin prior to immigration. Again, this effect is greater
for economic immigrants from English-speaking countries, and
least for refugees.
Most striking is the generally positive effect of duration of residence in the United States on the earnings of immigrants. The
effect is curvilinear: earnings generally rise very sharply during the
first few years, and then continue to rise at a decreasing rate with
the duration of residence. The magnitude of the rise in earnings
with duration of residence is greater for those who must undergo
the greatest economic adjustment on arrival (refugees), and weakest for those with the smallest economic adjustment (Englishspeaking economic migrants). Although on arrival male economic
migrants have lower earnings than their native-born counterparts,
if other factors are the same, economic migrants reach earnings
parity after eleven to fifteen years. Thereafter, the immigrants
have higher earnings.
Earnings also are related to the cause of the migration. Earnings are greater for economic migrants than for political refugees,
presumably because noneconomic factors influence the migration
decision of the latter, and because refugees have fewer transferable
skills. Earnings -on arrival are very low for refugees (again, assuming other variables are the same); although the gap narrows with a
longer residence, it does not close. The data also suggest that tied
movers, who base their decision to migrate primarily on the migration decision of a family member, have lower earnings than the primary economic migrant. The 1970 Census of Population evidenced
that, if other forces are the same, women who married prior to immigration consistently had lower hourly earnings than those who
married after immigration. 47 Tied movers had lower earnings and
higher unemployment rates at their destination than similarly situated internal migrants who were not tied movers. 8 It also has been
ment of Labor) (available from National Technical Information Service, NTIS No. PB 80200454) [hereinafter cited as B. CHISWICK, EcONOMIC PROGRESS]. The data are from the U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION.
47. See B. CHISWICK, ECONOMIC PROGRESS, supra note 46, at 182, 200.
48. Mincer, Family Migration Decisions, 86 J. POL. ECON. 749 (1978).
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found that, other things being equal after seven years in the
United States, persons admitted under the kinship immigration
criteria had lower earnings than occupational-preference and nonpreference immigrants. 9 The superior performance of primary economic migrants in comparison with, those whose migration is influenced by kinship ties, even when other measured variables are the
same, is presumably related to the transferability of skill, ability,
motivation for personal labor-market advancement, and continuity
of attachment to the labor market.
There is a substantial difference in earnings between immigrants from advanced industrialized societies and those from less
developed countries. This difference is partly attributable to the
latter's fewer years of formal schooling. Even so, some substantial
and significant differences remain. For example, when other factors
remain constant, including area of residence in the United States
and marital status, immigrants from Mexico earn about twenty
percent less than European immigrants. Perhaps this arises because the earnings gain from migration from Mexico is so substantial that it is worthwhile, even if earnings are lower than average in
the United States. But immigration from the higher-income countries is profitable only if higher than average earnings can be obtained in the United States.5
IV.

ECONOMIC IMPACT

The formation of immigration policy, as with other types of
public policy, would be simpler if the native population were homogeneous. Then the average impact of immigrants on the native
population would be the impact on each and every native person.
However, natives are heterogeneous in both their human and nonhuman assets. Consequently, in policy debates the distribution of
the impact can be as important as, if not more important than, the
overall impact.
A.

Unemployment Myths and Realities

Much of the public debate regarding immigrants is expressed
49. See D. NORTH, SEVEN YEARS LATER: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 1970 COHORT OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 102-04 (report prepared for the Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor).
50. For reasons that remain unclear, if other variables are constant, the earnings differential of about 20% between Mexican-Americans and Anglos also exists among second generation Americans (native-born but with at least one foreign-born parent) and higher-generation Americans (both parents born in the United States).
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in terms of unemployment. Recently, there has been bipartisan political support for the immigrant-unemployment connection: Both
the Secretary of Labor in the Carter administration and the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the
Ford administration attributed the unemployment of at least two
to three million Americans to illegal aliens. 5' The economic fear is
that immigrants take jobs that natives would otherwise have,
thereby contributing to unemployment.
It is important to distinguish between taking a particular job
"slot," and depriving a native worker of a job. For example, if an
immigrant takes a particular job washing dishes in a restaurant,
then that job slot clearly has not been filled by a native-born
worker. This visible effect generates resentment. It is, however, the
availability of jobs that attracts workers into the U.S. labor market, both from the household sector (outside the labor force) and
from other countries. The absolute growth in employment in the
United States consistently has exceeded the growth in the numbers
unemployed. There is no fixed number of jobs in the economy; the
extent of employment generally increases with increased immigration, although relative wages may change.
Suppose an immigrant takes a job that otherwise would have
been occupied by a native worker. The immigrant either may
hoard his earnings, spend all of his earnings, or do something in
between. If the immigrant hoards his earnings, the natives gain the
benefit of his production, giving nothing in return but green pieces
of paper that are inexpensive to produce. The effect is deflationary-it is as if the Federal Reserve System reduced the money supply by the amount hoarded. 2 Natives as a whole would have
greater income. Native workers would allocate themselves among
jobs in the labor market, and the rate of increase in the price level
would be lower than otherwise. As long as there is some flexibility
in wages, and workers can change jobs, no permanent unemployment is created.
More likely, the immigrant spends his earnings either in the
United States or by emigrant remittances to his home country.
51. See Illegal Aliens Take Jobs of Citizens, Marshall Declares, L.A. Times, Dec. 2,
1979, § 1, at 1, col. 2; Chapman, "Silent Invasion" that Takes Millions of American Jobs,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 9, 1974, at 77-78. This view is not confined to the United
States. "One and a half million unemployed is one and half million immigrants too many,"
is also the slogan of anti-immigrant elements in France. French DirectingAnger at Immi-

grant Workers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1980, at A3, col. 5.
52. The deflationary effect, of course, could be offset by appropriate adjustments in
monetary policy.
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There is no deflationary effect, as the extra output produced by
the immigrant is matched by the increase in the aggregate demand
for goods and services. Employment is generated as workers produce the goods and services purchased by the immigrants.
In either instance, immigration per se does not result in a permanent net loss in jobs to natives, even if immigrants take particular job slots that native workers otherwise would occupy. There
are, however, three circumstances in which immigration could result in increased measured unemployment, although they are not
what proponents of the immigrant-unemployment connection appear to be discussing: (1) the unemployment of immigrants per se;
(2) frictional unemployment among the native population; and (3)
structural unemployment arising from wage rigidities.
Recent entrants to the labor force-whether they are youths
leaving school, women entering or reentering the labor market, or
new immigrants-engage in a job search. It takes time to find a
job, and one way of learning about occupations and employers is to
experience a variety of jobs. Higher than average voluntary job
turnover is therefore a characteristic of recent labor force entrants.
Recent immigrants, in particular, experience substantial upward
occupational mobility, presumably often accompanied by periods
of voluntary unemployment as their skills adjust to the American
labor market. Recent labor-market entrants may also experience
greater involuntary separations from employment since their employers had less information about them when they were hired and
the workers have less seniority. Moreover, their employers have
made smaller investments in their firm-specific training.
Data from the 1970 Census and the 1976 Survey of Income
and Education (SIE) suggest that, other factors being equal, the
number of weeks worked by adult white men in a year was lower
among recent immigrants than among the native-born and longterm immigrants." In the 1970 Census, which recorded year of immigration in five-year intervals, the foreign-born in the United
States for less than five years worked three weeks less than the
native-born. Immigrants in the United States five to nine years
worked one week less. For immigrants in the United States for ten
or more years, there was no difference from the native-born.
Among the foreign-born, those in the United States for less than
five years worked about three weeks fewer than others, with no
53. The empirical analyses reported in this paragraph and the next are based on B.
(1982).
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significant differences among the six cohorts identified in the data
who were in the United States for five or more years. Although the
sample sizes in the 1976 SIE are smaller than in the one-in-a-hundred sample from the 1970 Census, the greater detail on specific
year of immigration for those in the United States for five or fewer
years is illuminating. The SIE data suggest that most of the
smaller number of weeks worked among those in the United States
for five or fewer years is concentrated among the very recent arrivals; the difference in weeks worked narrows rapidly, virtually disappearing by the end of three to five years.
As is true among the native-born, the number of weeks worked
is greater the higher the level of schooling and the greater the extent of labor-market experience (both before and after immigration) for the foreign-born. The number of weeks worked is also
greater for those whose skills are more readily transferable to the
U.S. labor-market. Other things being equal, immigrants from
Cuba, Southern Europe, and the Balkans worked one week less
than immigrants from the British Isles, while immigrants from
Mexico worked two weeks less, and those from other Latin American countries worked 1.5 weeks less.
An influx of workers due to immigration will generate frictional unemployment among native-born workers. Frictional unemployment will arise whenever there is a change in the demand
for or supply of labor that affects relative wage opportunities.
Some workers will quit their current jobs in search of new higherpaying jobs. Employers in sectors where workers' marginal productivity has fallen below their wages will lay off some workers. Given
the change in labor market opportunities, both workers and employers invest more in information regarding the labor market, resulting in frictional unemployment. Given the immigration, the
frictional unemployment represents an efficient process through
which workers identify and gravitate to what is currently their best
employment opportunity, and through which employers adjust
their work force to the new economic conditions.
Only a small proportion of native-born workers will experience
frictional unemployment arising from immigration. Additionally,
this unemployment will be short-lived; it will dampen as workers
find their best employment opportunities in the new environment.
The extent of frictional unemployment will be less the greater the
extent to which immigrants are attracted to the United States and
particular occupations or geographic areas by expanding job opportunities. Frictional unemployment will be greater if immigrants are
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entering stagnant occupations or economically stagnant regions.
Thus, for a given size of a cohort of immigrants, frictional unemployment among the native population will tend to be smaller if
the immigration is predominantly economic in nature rather than
based on kinship or other criteria.
Wage rigidities, whether instituted by a legal minimum wage,
a union wage, or social convention, can result in unemployment
among the native-born if immigration would depress the market
wage below the wage floor. 4 If the wage floor exceeds the market
wage, more workers will offer their labor services than there are job
slots. One solution is, of course, to eliminate the wage floor. A "second best" solution is to implement an immigration policy that
would favor the immigration of high-skilled workers. This would
cause the productivity of low-skilled native workers to rise and
would reduce the pressures against the federal minimum wage. Although this policy would have particularly favorable impacts on
the employment opportunities of native-born youths and disadvantaged minorities, it would also place downward pressure on the
wages of the high-skilled workers.
B.

Impact on Income

For simplicity of exposition regarding the impact of immigrants on the level and distribution of income, assume that there
are two types of workers, low-skilled and high-skilled, that within
each type all workers are homogeneous, and that the only other
factor of production is physical capital.5 5 Assume also that the
three factors of production are substitutes for each other, and that
the production function approximates one with constant elasticity
of substitution. Even in such a simplified situation, the impact of
immigration is difficult to determine because of the potential for
immigrant cohorts with quite different productivity characteristics.
Although partially determined by external forces-such as a reces54. Some of the high unemployment or low number of weeks worked among immigrants
during their first few years may be a consequence of such wage rigidities. On arrival, immigrants tend to be relatively unproductive. But with the passage of time, and the increase in
job experience, immigrants acquire skills that will help them obtain higher-paying jobs in
the United States. By reducing the option of working in very low wage jobs that provide
substantial training, the minimum wage may be impeding the upward economic mobility of
immigrants.
55. The discussion in this section is based on a theoretical analysis developed in detail
in Chiswick, The Impact of Immigration on the Level and Distributionof Economic WellBeing, in THE GATEWAY: U.S. IMMIGRATION ISSUES AND POLICIES (B. Chiswick ed. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Chiswick, Immigration Impact].
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sion in one country or a revolution in another-under current circumstances and immigration quota ceilings, the characteristics of
immigrant cohorts are largely determined by the United States immigration policy over a period of years.
Again, for purposes of exposition, consider the implications of
two polar cases: a cohort of low-skilled workers and a cohort of
high-skilled workers. The immigration of low-skilled workers
reduces the marginal product of low-skilled native workers, but
raises the marginal product of high-skilled workers and capital.
The former effect arises from the greater labor supply of lowskilled workers, who are good substitutes in production for native
low-skilled workers. The latter arises from the principle of complementarity-that the marginal product of a factor increases when
the quantity of other factors of production with which it works increases. Although one native factor loses and the other native factors gain, the overall income of the native population increases.
This is because the losses to native low-skilled labor are more than
offset by the gains to native high-skilled labor and capital. Thus,
average income among the native population increases, but the distribution of this income becomes more unequal.
The increase in the average income of the native population
contrasts with the decline in the average income of the total population (natives augmented by immigrants). This decline arises from
the assumption that low-skilled immigrants have lower incomes
than the native population's average income. Thus, if the native
population's average income is a variable of primary interest for
determining the appropriate immigration policy, changes in the total population's average income may be a misleading indicator.
The decline in the earnings of low-skilled native workers as a
result of low-skilled immigration is partially mitigated by the income tax and the mix of income transfers. Many of the recipients
of income-contingent transfers, particularly recipients of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and most of the aged recipients of
Social Security and Medicare have little or no attachment to the
labor market and hence do not suffer a direct adverse impact.
Those who do suffer a direct impact-the working poor-may be
eligible for food stamps, and, in the case of single-parent families,
AFDC. If they become unemployed, the poor may be eligible for
state unemployment compensation and AFDC-UP (Unemployed
Parents' component of AFDC). Because the native population's aggregate income has increased, at least in principle, sufficient in-
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come can be transferred from the gainers (high-skilled workers and
owners of capital) to the losers (native low-skilled workers), so that
all groups among the native population are at least as well off as
before the immigration.
A dilemma arises, however, because by tradition as well as by
law, legal immigrants (resident aliens) are eligible for the same income-transfer benefits as similarly situated natives.5 6 The theoretical model indicates that if the low-skilled immigrants are to receive
transfers that bring their incomes up to the pre-immigration income of native low-skilled workers, then the aggregate transfers
will exceed the increase in income of high-skilled workers and capital. Thus, the native population as a whole can be made worse off.
With the immigration of a cohort of high-skilled workers, the
wages of native high-skilled workers decline, while the wages of native low-skilled workers and the returns to capital, increase. The
aggregate income, and hence the native population's average income, increases. The change in the total population's average income cannot be determined, however, without knowing whether
the average income of the high-skilled immigrants is higher or
lower than the income (earnings and return to capital) of the native population. The narrowing of skill differentials would appeal
to those who dislike inequality in labor-market outcomes.
The rise in the wages of native low-skilled workers increases
their tax payments and lowers their receipt of income-contingent
transfers. Because of these resources, as well as the higher taxes
paid by capital and the positive taxes paid by high-skilled immigrants, the marginal tax rates on the earnings of native high-skilled
workers can be lowered. Thus, net of the tax-transfer system, highskilled workers can be made at least as well off as before the immigration, without eliminating all of the gains of native low-skilled
workers and capital. With high-skilled immigrants, equal treatment of immigrants and natives can be maintained in the incometransfer system, and all native groups can be made at least as welloff as before the immigration.
Recent empirical research has examined the relation between
the characteristics of immigrants and the earnings of the nativeborn.5 7 The analysis has been done for adult white non-Hispanic
56. The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. V 1981), limits an immigrant's
receipt of Supplemental Security Income benefits during the first three years in the United
States, unless an unanticipated disability arises after immigration. SSI provides cash benefits for low-income aged and disabled persons.
57. B. Chiswick, The Effects of Immigration on Earnings and Employment in the
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native-born men, using the 1970 Census. Holding constant the native-born person's human capital and demographic characteristics,
weekly earnings among the native-born rise with an increase in the
level of the foreign-born's schooling and labor-market experience.
In addition, using immigrants from the English-speaking developed countries as a benchmark, earnings among the native-born
rise with an increase in the proportion of immigrants from Europe
and a decrease in the proportion from Cuba and other less-developed countries, while there is no differential effect for the proportion from Mexico. Thus, more highly skilled or more productive
immigrants are associated with greater earnings among the nativeborn.
An often-expressed concern is that immigrants can take advantage of society's investment in public capital. By using roads,
schools, dams, and parks that have been constructed before their
immigration, immigrants "dilute" the public capital available to
the native population, thereby decreasing the native population's
income. Highly skilled immigrants would be substantial beneficiaries of income transfers broadly defined to include the consumption of public capital. 8 This point, however, confuses the timing of
the construction of public capital with the financing of this capital.
The construction of most public capital is financed not from current tax receipts, but rather from bonds that are retired with revenues raised from user-fees or taxes as the capital is consumed. To
the extent that the public capital is paid for as it is consumed,
immigrants do not gain, and there is no dilution of the natives'
public capital even if it is constructed prior to the immigration.
V.

ALTERNATIVE IMMIGRATION POLICIES

The review of current United States policy has shown that
kinship is the primary criterion for rationing immigration visas,
and that the visa applicant's skills or productivity characteristics
play a relatively minor role. There is a considerable difference between the skill levels and earnings of immigrants admitted under
the kinship criteria and under the productivity criteria. More
favorable impacts on the level and distribution of the native population's income arise from higher-skilled immigrants than from
United States, Part B, (1981) (available at University of Illinois at Chicago, Survey Research Laboratory).
58. This is one of the arguments discussed in Usher, PublicProperty and the Effects of
Migration upon Other Residents of the Migrants' Countries of Origin and Destination, 85

J. POL. EcoN. 1001 (1977).
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lower-skilled immigrants.
This section reviews two very different approaches to the reform of immigration policy." The first is a skill-based rationing
system in which an applicant's skill level, and hence the likelihood
of his economic success in the United States, are the primary determinants of whether a visa is issued. 0 A point system is proposed for administering the program. The second approach is the
set of recommendations from the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy 1 for modifications of the current system.
The Commission's recommendations apparently would: (1) reduce
the already small role of productivity characteristics in issuing immigration visas, (2) grant amnesty for illegal aliens, and (3) increase the relative and absolute number of low-skilled workers in
future cohorts of immigrants.
A.

A Skill-Based Rationing System

The current immigration policy could be shifted radically by
focusing on productivity characteristics instead of kinship criteria.
Under a productivity or skill-based policy, the primary criterion
for rationing admissions would be the person's estimated productivity in the United States.2 Research indicates that an immigrant's productivity, as measured by earnings and employment, appears to be related to the level and transferability of preimmigration skills, including the level of schooling, vocational and
on-the-job training, occupation, and knowledge of English. Prearranged employment also may be an aid to increased productivity.
In a productivity-based immigration policy, there is a temptation to grant visas to applicants in narrowly defined occupations in
which there are "shortages," and to deny visas to applicants in
"crowded" occupations. Indeed, in the occupational preferences of
current immigration law, this approach has been adopted with absurd consequences. Physicians, nurses, physical therapists,
dieticians, and others, are added to or withdrawn from the list of
59. Policies regarding refugees and temporary (guest) workers are beyond the scope of

this section.
60. For a detailed analysis of this approach, see P. CAFFERTY, B. CHISWlCK, A. GREELEY
& T. SULLIVAN, THE DILEMMA OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION: BEYOND THE GOLDEN DOOR (in
press).
61. The Commission was established by the Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 4,
92 Stat. 907-09 (1978), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-132, § 23, 93 Stat. 1051-52 (1979).
62. Productivity or skill characteristics and a point system form the basis for rationing
visas in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
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the most favored (Schedule A) occupations on the basis of political
pressures of interested parties rather than on labor market studies."' Studies are not done to determine whether other occupations,
such as engineering, are in equally "short supply." The economic
aspects of the issues, including the subsequent occupational adjustments of the immigrants and the change in the occupational
structure of the native-born labor force as a consequence of immigration, appear to play no role in the rulemaking process.
The granting of visas on the basis of narrowly defined occupations invites efforts to subvert the system. If the occupational categories are defined more broadly, however, then the adverse impact
from a cohort of immigrants will be more diffused. This might help
to avoid the manipulation of a skill-based rationing system by narrow occupational interests. Also, there will be less incentive for any
one occupation to attempt to close their occupational category.
It is difficult for planners to know where there will be labor
"shortages" and where there will be labor "surpluses" in the coming years. Occupational adjustments occur not only through the
immigration of persons in the occupation but also through the substantial occupational change of immigrants after they arrive in the
United States, and through the occupational change of natives.
The focus in a skill-based rationing system should be on an applicant's skill level, rather than on his narrowly defined occupation.
To combine the multidimensional aspects of skills into rationing criteria, it may be necessary to adopt a point system rather
than a preference system. In a preference system, as formulated
under current law, a person must meet a minimum standard under
any one of several categories to be eligible for a visa. 4 There is no
possibility for combining equities under each of two or more categories to raise one's rank in the queue. But under a point system, it
is the sum of the points obtained from several categories that is
relevant, rather than crossing a threshold in any one category.
Under a point system, points could be earned for various productivity traits, and a visa would be issued to persons who received
a minimum number of points." Each year of schooling may be
worth, for example, two points. Apprenticeship, vocational train63. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 10.

65. Persons exempt from the point system would be the immediate relatives (spouse
and minor children) of U.S. citizens, refugees and their immediate relatives, and the immediate relatives of persons given an immigrant visa if they accompany the immigrant or come
within a certain time (perhaps one year).
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ing, and on-the-job training also would be worth a certain number
of points. Points could be earned, possibly on a scale of zero to
five, for fluency in English. Other points could be awarded for prearranged employment. To preserve the nonracist character of immigration policy, points should not be granted on the basis of race,
ethnicity, religion, or country of origin."
Evaluating skills and awarding points should be the responsibility of a single agency-the Immigration Service. To have this
function performed in either the Department of Labor or the Department of Commerce would be to invite efforts by interest
groups entrenched in either agency to subvert the system for their
own purposes. As an independent agency, the Immigration Service
would be subject to influences from many sources, and thus might
6
be better able to steer a middle course. 7
To reduce variations in the annual number of immigrants, a
worldwide annual quota could be retained, with visas issued to
those with the largest number of points among those who satisfy
the threshold. To reduce the uncertainty concerning when permission to immigrate will be granted among those in the queue, additional points (that do not count toward the minimum threshold)
might be given for waiting in the queue. Of course, if the queue
gets too long, either the minimum threshold number or the annual
quota should be increased.
The point system can be flexible to provide greater immigration opportunities for persons with relatives in the United States.
This should be done without violating the rationing system's con66. Canada uses a point system similar to the one suggested here for persons who are
not the immediate relatives of citizens. In addition to the criteria indicated in this section,
Canada gives points for the intention to settle in a geographic area that the Canadian government wishes to populate. The policy is of limited effectiveness because internal geographic mobility after immigration is not restricted. Because specific residential location
would not be enforceable in the United States, and because the United States does not have
a clearly defined regional policy, this would appear to be an inappropriate criterion for U.S.

policy. Indeed, efforts by the federal government to disperse the Indochinese refugees geographically have been ineffective. There has been substantial internal migration from the
community of first settlement to California, their preferred state of residence. See Gordon,
Settlement Patterns of Indochinese Refugees in the United States, I.N.S. REP., Spring

1980, at 6-10.
67. There is no compelling reason for immigration matters to be part of the Department of Justice. The immigration and naturalization functions are separable, and the latter
only may be an appropriate function for the Department. As an independent agency, the
new Immigration Service would be less constrained by Justice Department interests in making its case for more resources for enforcement, and would be in a better position to institute regulations and recommend policy changes based on overall economic considerations.
The agency shall not have cabinet status.
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cern for the economic impact of immigrants. A small number of
points may be awarded, for example, to applicants with relatives in
the United States who will guarantee their financial support for a
certain length of time. In this manner, persons who do not satisfy
the general productivity criterion, but whose presence is of "consumption value" to their relatives in this country, would be more
able to immigrate legally.
History provides some examples of what the proposed immigration policy's effect would be on the occupational distribution of
immigrants. In 1962 Canada shifted from a kinship-based immigration policy, not unlike current United States policy, to a system
with kinship criteria for immediate relatives of Canadians and a
primarily skill-based point system for others. The proportion of
professional and technical workers among the immigrants increased from an annual average of twelve percent in 1956-1960 to
an annual average of twenty-six percent in 1962-1971. The annual
average proportion of unskilled workers declined from thirty-six
8
percent in 1956-1960 to sixteen percent in 1962-1971.1
Some may argue that the productivity criterion outlined above
is antifamily-that such a dramatic change from the current system would end the humanitarian goal of family reunification. This
is not so. Foreigners with more kinsmen in the United States
would still be more likely to apply for an immigrant visa, because
immigrating to the United States is more attractive to them than
to others in their home country. Additionally, the immediate relatives of United States citizens would still be eligible for admission
without numerical restrictions. For other applicants, those who
have sufficient points to immigrate could do so, and could be "reunited" with family members. A person with kinsmen in the
United States would have two advantages: his relatives could help
him prearrange employment, and they could guarantee his
financial support for the first five years. Willingness to engage in
these activities is one test of the relative's interest in his kinsmen's
immigration.6
Many aliens can immigrate under the current kinship criteria
but not under the productivity criteria. Their immigration is at the
expense of the native population, since the United States will be
68. Parai, Canada'sImmigration Policy, 1962-74, 9 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 449, 469-72
(1975).
69. Voluntary family dislocations that arise from economic migration are a less compelling reason for special "family reunification" visas than are the involuntary separations and
dislocations often arising from situations that create refugees.
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accepting a less productive worker instead of a more productive
worker. The largest adverse impact under the current system is experienced by native-born low-skilled workers. These workers face
greater competition in the labor market and in the allocation of
income-contingent transfers from a larger number of low-skilled
immigrants. The current system provides the largest benefits to
the relatives of immigrants entering under kinship criteria, many
of whom are themselves recent citizens and resident aliens. This
inequity would be removed under the productivity criteria.
The political support for admitting a larger number of immigrants each year would be more broadly based under a skill-based
rationing system than under the current kinship system. This is
because of the more favorable impact of immigration on both the
level and distribution of income. The extent to which the optimal
number of immigrants would increase as a consequence of the
change in criteria is an empirical question that warrants further
study.
B.

The SCIRP Recommendations

The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy
(SCIRP), created by an act of Congress in 1978,70 released its recommendations in February 1981.71 The Commission's recommendations focused on a modification of the preference system for legal immigrants, amnesty for illegal aliens in the United States, and
policies to control future illegal immigration. The apparent thrust
of the Commission's recommendations is to: (1) increase the role of
kinship, (2) decrease the already small role of skill or productivity
in rationing immigration visas, (3) increase immigration of lowproductivity workers, and (4) shift much of the burden of the enforcement of immigration law onto employers through a requirement that they screen all workers for their legal status.
SCIRP recommended retaining the current policy of allowing
immigration without numerical limit for the spouses, minor unmarried children, and parents of adult citizens. It also recommended adding adult unmarried children (currently the first preference) and grandparents of adult citizens to the exempt list.
Under current regulations, there is little binding constraint on
70. Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 4, 92 Stat. 907-09 (1978), amended by
Pub. L. No. 96-132, § 23, 93 Stat. 1051-52 (1979).

71. SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as
SCIRP].
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first-preference visa applicants from most countries, with the ex72
ception of Mexico.

The Commission endorsed a worldwide numerical limit and
country quotas for other relatives and "independent immigrants."
The recommended worldwide limit is 350,000 visas per year, with
an additional 100,000 visas per year for five years to reduce the

visa backlog.78 The categories for other relatives would include the
current second, fourth, and fifth preferences. A new category, the
unmarried adult children of resident aliens, would also be in-

cluded. The Commission further recommended that a "substantial" number of visas be set aside for the spouses and unmarried
children of resident aliens, that there be no country ceilings for the
spouses and minor children of resident aliens, 4 and that these
visas be issued on a first-come, first-served basis. The second-preference country ceiling is severely binding only for Mexico and the
Philippines. As of February 1983, second-preference applications
by Mexican nationals filed in February 1974 were at the top of the
queue.7 5 The recommendations regarding the current second preference are related to the Commission's proposal of amnesty.
SCIRP views the independent immigrant category, which
would replace current occupational and nonpreference categories,
as a means of creating new kinship immigration streams ("new

seed" immigrants), rather than as a mechanism for selecting workers with the greatest productivity in the United States. 76 The inde-

pendent category includes a numerically limited number of persons
72. As of January 1, 1980, Mexican nationals totaled 38% of the first preference visa
backlog. Id. at 146.
73. Id. at 149. As of January 1, 1980, there was a backlog of 1.1 million visa applications, an increase of 100,000 over the previous year. Id. at 146. The Commissioners called for
reducing the visa backlog as quickly as possible. Although no formal vote was taken, the
report notes that "many Commissioners are of the view that per-country and preference
ceilings-although applied to new applicants under the proposed system-should not apply
to those in the backlogs." Id. at 150. Much of the backlog is concentrated in a small number
of countries, including Mexico (25%), the Philippines (23%), and Korea (7%). The backlog
exists primarily in the kinship preferences and nonpreference categories (5% in the second
preference, 50% in the fifth preference and 26% in the nonpreference category), with only
7% in the occupational preferences. Id. at 146.
74. Id. at 148.
75. 5 Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Office, U.S. Dep't of State, Immigrant Numbers
for February 1983 (No. 33, 1983).
76. "It is the Commission's hope that this category will provide immigration opportunities for those persons who come from countries where immigration to the United States has
not been recent or from countries that have no immigration base here." SCIRP, supra note
72, at 16.
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with "exceptional merit and ability in their professions."77 Nonetheless, the Commission also stated,
The Commission's intent is not to provide a separate category
for highly trained or needed professionals (for example, nurses,
doctors, engineers), artists or other persons of merit unless they
are exceptional and qualify under specific established guidelines. .... [T]he Commission further cautions against the creation of a significant channel which could deprive other nations
78
of the highly skilled persons they need.

A presumably larger category of other independent migrants is also
proposed, to "allow the entry of persons without family ties in the
United States and of persons whose family ties are distant ...
One possible benefit will be the increased proportion of immigrants screened for labor market impact; this will both protect U.S.
79
workers and enhance economic growth.

SCIRP recommended amnesty for illegal aliens in the United
States as of January 1, 1980.80 Once given an adjustment of status,
these persons could serve as sponsors for their relatives. Amnesty
would increase the number of low-skilled workers in the United
States in three ways. First, the prospect of amnesty would encourage the illegal immigration of other low-skilled workers with
the expectation that, once granted, amnesty would be offered repeatedly. Indeed, illegal immigration increased sharply when President Carter made his proposal for amnesty in 1977. Second, amnesty would increase substantially the demand for immigration
visas by the spouses and children of those given amnesty, and
many of these soon would enter the labor market. The recommendations mentioned above for more favorable treatment of this category of immigrant, especially for Mexican nationals, would allow
the system to satisfy much of this increased demand for visas.
Third, many illegal aliens who return home during periods of seasonal and cyclical slack in employment would remain in the United
States, as their families would be with them and they would be
77. Id. at 130.
78. Id. The Commission's view regarding the immigration of professionals is exemplified by its statement on nurses:
The Commission concludes that the continuing shortage of practicing nurses in
the United States justifies the admission of foreign nurses while that shortage
continues, but urges that efforts be intensified to make nursing a more attractive
career to induce more inactive U.S. nurses to return to that profession.
Id. at 223.
79. Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 76-77.
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able to receive income transfers legally.
SCIRP proposes to control future illegal immigration through
increased resources for border enforcement, and through employer
sanctions."' The Commission favors border enforcement more than
interior enforcement by the immigration authorities: "It is both
more humane and cost effective to deter people from entering the
United States than it is to locate and remove them from the interior."82 Border enforcement may be more cost effective per apprehension, but it is not necessarily more cost effective per deterred
alien. A recommendation is made for a "substantial increase" in
funding and personnel for the border patrol,8" but no parallel recommendation exists for interior enforcement. There are no recommendations for penalties, other than deportation, against apprehended illegal aliens, even for those who engage in flagrant and
frequent violations of the law. SCIRP also endorsed the Attorney
General's ruling that "state and local law enforcement officers
should be prohibited from apprehending persons on immigration
charges, except in alien-smuggling cases."'" This ruling limits the
effectiveness of interior enforcement.
In spite of this hands-off policy for official law enforcement
agents, the Commission has endorsed civil penalties against employers who knowingly employ illegal aliens, and criminal penalties
against employers who engage in "flagrant and extended violations
of the law following the imposition of civil penalties."83 The Commission was vague about the mechanism through which employers
could verify a worker's legal status, stating simply that it "support[s] a means of verifying employee eligibility that will allow employers to confidently and easily hire those persons who may legally accept employment." 86 The report does not indicate the
magnitude of these costs of employee verification, their effects on
the employment opportunities of high-turnover, low-skilled American workers, or whether such verification is feasible without a national identity card. Employer sanctions are not likely to reduce
employment opportunities for illegal aliens without both a reasonably foolproof means of checking a person's legal right to work,
and vigorous internal enforcement.
81. Id. at 46-52.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 67.
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Although there is much public concern about the use of welfare and subsidized medical care by illegal aliens, the Commission
did not offer any recommendations on this issue. It did not, for
example, endorse or even vote on proposals that have been made
to alter current regulations of the Department of Health and
Human Services that bar welfare and other public aid agencies
from reporting suspected illegal aliens to the immigration authorities. Indeed, it is curious that SCIRP endorsed extending the burden of enforcement to employers, while favoring the current restrictions on referrals by state and local law enforcement
authorities and welfare agencies.
The overall thrust of SCIRP's policy recommendations is to
increase both the number and proportion of low-skilled immigrants
while decreasing the number of high-skilled immigrants. This emphasis presumably arises from the Commission's concern for
"global inequities, ' '87 and what appears to be a desire to increase

substantially immigration from Mexico. In nearly every instance,
recommended modifications of current policy would favor Mexican
immigrants over immigrants from other countries. These policies
would deprive the United States of many highly productive foreign
workers, depress the earnings of low-skilled American workers, and
result in increased taxes to pay for an expanded income-transfer
system. The economic impacts of SCIRP's recommendations appear to have been of minor concern to the Commission.88
VI.

CONCLUSION

Immigration will continue to play an important role in American economic life. The public policy issue is not simply whether
immigration per se is beneficial, but rather whether increased benefits to the United States can be obtained from changes in the
number of immigrants and the rationing criteria. In an era such as
the nineteenth century when public policy showed little regard for
the income-distribution impacts of immigration, and when there
were no public income-transfer systems to mitigate the losses to
groups for whom the impact was adverse, an open-door or laissezfaire immigration policy was politically acceptable. These conditions no longer prevail, and an open-door immigration policy is not
87. Id. at 20.
88. This perhaps was foreshadowed by the Commission's research agenda, which virtually ignored research on illegal aliens and the labor market impact of immigrants. See id. at
436-37.
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politically viable. If there are to be limits on immigration, then
there must be a rationing mechanism. A mechanism that would
provide more rapid growth in the income of the native population
and a relatively smaller transfer system is generally preferable to
one that offers opposite effects.
Current immigration policy is characterized by a rationing system based on kinship and by lax enforcement of immigration law.
This policy has encouraged larger numbers of low-skilled immigrants to arrive in the United States than would have been here
had the rationing criteria focused on the level of skill. SCIRP apparently would increase further the role of kinship, and decrease
the already small role of the productivity characteristics or skills of
the visa applicants. Rather than endorsing a major strengthening
of the enforcement of current immigration law, the Select Commission proposes legalizing the status of illegal aliens in the United
States, and shifting much of the enforcement responsibilities to
employers through sanctions against those who employ illegal
aliens. The Commissioners equivocated, however, on the crucial issue of how employer sanctions were to be administered. Also, they
did not address the adverse impact of the additional cost of employer screening of workers upon employment opportunities for
native workers in low-wage, high-turnover jobs.
As an alternative, a two-pronged policy approach could be
adopted. One prong would be the more stringent enforcement of
current immigration law-not only at the border, but also in the
interior. Under this approach,*there would be no blanket amnesty
for illegal aliens, and the responsibility for enforcing immigration
law would not be shifted to employers. The second prong would
involve shifting the focus in rationing visas from kinship to the applicant's level of skill. As skill is not unidimensional, a point system should be adopted to combine the diverse elements into a single number. With the exception of the immediate relatives of adult
U.S. citizens, whose entry would not be subject to numerical limitations, visas would be issued to those with the greatest number of
points, i.e., to those with the greatest potential productivity in the
United States. Points also could be given for less immediate kinship relationships, but this should not be allowed to overwhelm the
productivity criteria. These proposals would better satisfy the twin
objectives of increasing the productive potential of the economy
and reducing the relative size of the income transfer system than
would either the current system or the Select Commission's
recommendations.

